Nuclear Terrorism Part II - Terrorists Do Not Need To Build Nuclear Weapons

Terrorist do not have to build nuclear weapons. If a determined terrorist group wanted to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon, they would not have to perform any great feat to obtain the weapon. They would not need the technical know how to build a weapon or the support to smuggle it into our country. All our controls throughout the world to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining nuclear materials and all our controls designed to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons into our country would be useless. Terrorists do not have to build bombs because we do not adequately protect our nuclear plants.

The lack of green house gas emissions has turned nuclear power into a viable option for many ecology-minded groups. Their most vocal opposition is no longer the long haired liberal protesters of the seventies. Their most vocal critics are conservatives who support nuclear power in theory. Its critics view nuclear power plants as poorly defended targets in the war on terrorism.

The security measures which protect our nuclear plants can best be referred to as thrifty. The United States has over one hundred nuclear plants and not a single one is protected by an adequate security force. Despite this, George Bush was reported as saying “"It's time for the country to start building nuclear power plants again," by CNNMoney.com on June 21st.

On December 5, 2001, Paul Levanthal the President of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) testified before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations that “the nation’s nuclear power reactors are vulnerable to attack by terrorist attack.” In his testimony, he requested significant upgrades to the security. His request went largely unanswered.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s website outlines the security procedures and standards which the nuclear plants are required to adhere. The security procedures are detailed. The plants are evaluated according to two sets of criteria: Performance Indicators reported by the licensees and Inspection Findings by the NRC. In the case of sub par results the government performs remediation activities to ensure that each plant meets the established security guidelines.

Upon initial review these procedures and guidelines seem sufficient. If a plant has sub par security test results, efforts are made to bring the security up to acceptable limits. The results of all of the tests are posted on the web, where they are open to public scrutiny.

Granted transparency is commendable, it can also be misleading. Negative test results are buried by large numbers of positive reports. Another issue is the relevance of the tests If the tests do not adequately represent real world threats, then posting their results on the web does not help.

For example, the most famous terrorist attack was performed on September 11, 2001 by four hijacked passenger airliners: two 767’s and two 757’s. These planes were used as flying bombs. Is defending against an airborne threat included as one of the tests that U.S. nuclear plants must face? No. This was not the decision made by the French, as their nuclear plants are defended by anti aircraft batteries.

According to testimony provided by NRC Chairman Richard Meserve on April 11, 2002 to the Subcommittee On Oversight And Investigations Committee On Energy And Commerce of the United States House Of Representatives Concerning Nuclear Power Plant Security:

“In light of the fact that nuclear plants were not specifically designed to withstand a deliberate direct impact of aircraft such as Boeing 757s or 767s, some people have suggested that anti-aircraft defenses should be installed at all U.S. nuclear power plant sites. Of course, the deployment of anti-aircraft weapons would be a decision for the Secretary of Defense, not the NRC.

However, the Commission has consulted with the Department of Defense, the Office of Homeland Security, and the FAA, and believes that reliance upon anti-aircraft weaponry at nuclear power plants is undesirable and, as a result, we have not advocated it.”

Richard Meserve went on to explain: “Any such application of anti-aircraft weapons would present significant command and control challenges. The operator of the anti-aircraft weapon would need continuous contact with someone who could authorize the downing of a civilian commercial aircraft, with all of the attendant implications, and would need to be able to carry out that act in seconds. It may be difficult in this context to distinguish an aircraft that had drifted off course from an aircraft on an attack mission. And, of course, anti-aircraft munitions could impose collateral damage on the surrounding community. For these reasons, the Commission believes the best general approach at the present time to deal with threats from aircraft is through strengthening airport and airline security measures.”

An additional determinant against stationing anti-aircraft weaponry at each of the over 100 current nuclear sites is cost.

An examination of the NRC’s website reveals that the security protecting our nuclear plants is inadequate on many levels. When the only penalty that the nuclear utilities face in case of sub par security results is a posting on an obscure internet site, the nuclear industry has no reason to spend more than the absolute minimum to protect our plants. Without strong incentives or penalties, the nuclear utilities have no reason to waste money on security.

If a nuclear accident does occur, is the nuclear utility liable? According to the Price Anderson Act (and the Energy Policy Act of 2005), the liability in case of nuclear disaster is limited. The nuclear utilities are required to maintain a pool of money to pay out in case of a nuclear accident. The act prevents insurance companies from suing nuclear power utilities to recover damages in the case of accident. As a result, many insurance companies have removed nuclear accidents from their coverage, which forces those affected to split the limited pool of money set aside by the Price Anderson Act.

Who pays for inadequate nuclear power plant security? Not the nuclear utilities. We do.

Andrew Horan is a member of the Paskamansett Project.

The results of each security test are posted on the internet for each plant at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/prevqtr.html

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